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Ward: Consensual Searches

CONSENSUAL SEARCHES, THE FAIRYTALE THAT
BECAME A NIGHTMARE: FARGO LESSONS
CONCERNING POLICE INITIATED ENCOUNTERS
Robeit V. Ward Jr."
SCENE FROM FARGO'

Chief Gunderson: "Mr. Londegaard,
again. Can I come in?"

sorry to bother you

Mr. Londegaard: "Yeah, no, I'm kind of, I'm kind of busy."
Gunderson: "I understand, I will keep it real short then."
"I am on my way out of town, but I was wondering, do you
mind if I sit down? I am carrying a bit of a load here."
Londegaard:

"No. I...."

Gunderson: "Yeah, it's this vehicle I asked about yesterday.
I was just wondering...."
Londegaard:
vehicles go missing."
Gunderson:
you know?"

"Yeah, like I told you, we haven't had any
"Okay! Are you sure? Cause I mean, how do
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Gunderson: "Okay! Are you sure? Cause I mean, how do
you know?"
"Because see in the crime I am investigating the perpetrators
were driving a car with dealer plates and they called someone who
works here. So it would be quite a coincidence if they weren't, you
know, connected."
Londegaard:
Gunderson:
inventory recently?"
Londegaard:
Gunderson:
doing a .... "
Londegaard:
manager."
Gunderson:
Londegaard:

"Yeah, I see."
"So, how do you, have you done any kind of
"The car is not from our lot Ma'am."
"But, how do you know that for sure? Without
"Well, I would know! I am the executive sales
"Yeah, but I understand."
"We run a pretty tight ship here."

Gunderson: "I know, but how do they establish that sir.
are
the cars counted daily or what kind of a routine here?"
mean
Londegaard:
Gunderson:

I

"Ma'am! I answered your question."
"I'm sorry sir."

"Ma'am, I answered your question. I answered
Londegaard:
the darn, I'm cooperating here and there is no um ......
Gunderson: "Sir, you have no call to get snippy with me, I
am just doing my job here."
"I'm, I'm not um, I'm not arguing here, I am
Londegaard:
cooperating and there's, we're doing all we can."
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Gunderson:
Londegaard."

"Sir, could I talk to Mr. Gasterson.

453
Mr.

Londegaard:
"Well heck, if you want to, if you want to play
games here I am working with you on this thing here, but. Okay! I'll
do a damn lot count."
Gunderson:

"Sir, right now."

Londegaard:
"Yeah, right now! You're darn tooting. If it
is so damn important to ya."
Gunderson:

"I am sorry sir."

Londegaard:

"Ah, what the Christ."

PART I
INTRODUCTION

Today most courts, in particular the United States Supreme
Court, would characterize Mr. Londegaard's visit with Police
Chief Gunderson as being a voluntary, consensual encounter. 2
Because the meeting was voluntary, Mr. Londegaard was not
officially detained. Thus, his Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable seizure was not violated. 3 In truth, Londegaard was
detained against his will. It is clear that he did not feel free to
leave. He was walking out the door when Chief Gunderson

2 Much

has been written in recent years about the significance of naming or
labeling an event. During the Los Angeles Riots, which occurred after several
police officers were acquitted in the beating of Rodney King, some described
the event as a "riot." Others called it an insurrection. See Kimberle Crenshaw
and Gary Peller, Reel Thne/Real Justice, 70 DEN.. L. REV. 283 (1993).
3 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224-49 (1973). The
Bustamnonte Court distinguished between the question of whether a person has
acted "voluntarily" and the question of whether there has been a "waiver" of
actual right. Id.
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brought his exit to an abrupt halt.4 Officer Gunderson had no
legal authority since she was beyond her jurisdiction. She did not
confront Londegaard with flashing blue lights or a gun. While
courts generally take the position that Londegaard was not in
custody,' a reasonable person under similar conditions would
also not believe that he or she could leave. 6 Londegaard's
presence at the car dealership at that moment was as voluntary as
a tiger caged in a local zoo.
The doctrine of consent currently applied by the Court
encourages officers to take advantage of ordinary citizens.'
These rules are not sufficiently sensitive to the disparate power
relationship that exists between the officer in uniform and
members of the public.' Police-initiated encounters, like the one
portrayed in Fargo, should be presumed to implicate Fourth
Amendment interests. Consequently, such meetings ought to be
viewed as illegal absent either probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. It is time to put to rest the legal fiction that a policeinitiated encounter with a member of the public can be voluntary,
without affirmative proof that the detainee intended to waive
his/her rights. This approach should be followed whether the
stop occurs on the street, in an airport, on a bus, in the home or
one's place of work.9

4

CHARLES

H.

WHITEBREAD AND

CHRISTOPHER

PROCEDURE, AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS

SLOBOGIN,

CRIMINAL

§3.02 at 69, § 11.02 (3d

ed. 1993).
' See U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); see generally INS. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1983); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991);
Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
6 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 210; See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1981); See WHITEBREAD, supra note 4.

' See generally Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 218; Robert Ward, Consenting to
Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a
Reasonable Person, 36 How. L J. 230 (1993).
8 See Ward, supra note 7.

9 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
(1991); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 210;see generally
WHITEBREAD AND SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at §3.02.
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A number of commentators have previously raised this point, '0

arguing that the Court ought to scrutinize these so called
voluntary meetings." Frequently they focus on the elements of
race, gender, class or sexual orientation.'" These scholars argue

that given the long history of subordination between members of
these groups and the police, greater care ought to be taken before
a court concludes that an encounter was voluntary.
This paper does not take issue with that approach. It simply
suggests that these commentators have not gone far enough. The
beauty of the exchange portrayed in Fargo is that Mr.
Londegaard does not belong to a subordinate community. The
detained suspect, a white male, is being interrogated by an
1 See Ward, supra note 7; see also Tracey Maclin, Black and Bll
Encounters, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243 (1991).
"See Ward, supra note 7.
2 Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333
(1998). For a sample of some of the legal scholarship on this point,see David
A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994) [hereinafter "Harris"]; Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L. REV.
214 (1983); Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary
Thoughts About Fourth Amenhnent Seizures: Should Race Matter?26VAL. U.
L. REV. 243 (1991); Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the
Inadequacy of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting
Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 151 (1994); David
0. Markus, Whren v. United States: A Pretert to Subvert the Fourth
Amendment, 14 HARv. BLACKLETTER J. (forthcoming 1998); William R.
O'Shields, The Exodus of Minorities' FourthAmendment Rights into Oblivion:
Floridav. Bostick and the Merits of Adopting a Per Se Rule Against Random,
Suspicionless Bus Searches in the Minority Connunity, 77 IowA L. REv. 1875
(1992); Adina Schwartz, "JustTake Away Their Guns": The Hidden Racism of
Terry v. Ohio, 23 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 317 (1996); Ward, supra note 7, at
239; Randall S. Susskind, Note, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion. and
Seizure, 31 AM. CraM. L. REv. 327 (1994). Professor Randall Kennedy has
written a powerful book on race and the criminal law. See RANDALL
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND LAw (1997).

A chapter in this book is devoted

to the appropriateness of using race as a proxy for criminal suspicion.
Professor Kennedy strongly opposes governmental use of race in this context.
See id. at 162.
"3Id.; See also Adrian Barrio, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustainonte:
Incorporating Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of
Voluntary Consent, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 240-41 (1997).
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angelic looking, very pregnant, white officer who, at that
moment, lacks any official power. She is authorized to arrest
suspects in Fargo, North Dakota, not Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Londegaard and Gunderson are on the same footing with respect
to race. Gunderson is conspicuously female, an ascribed status,
whose subordination to men is justified in terms of the biological
difference evident in Gunderson's physical condition. Londegaard
does not ignore Ms. Gunderson or override her objections.
Rather, he concedes her right to interrogate him.
In the absence of the usual trappings of oppression, one is
forced to examine the unique relationship between a uniformed
officer and a citizen.14 The officer in uniform, even one who is a
member of a less powerful group, represents power that is not
easily ignored. Mr. Londegaard did not voluntarily remain in his
office. It was not a consensual meeting.
This article examines the legal doctrines relating to detention,
voluntariness and consent in the context of police initiated
encounters. It is the author's goal to demonstrate that the judicial
interpretation of the Constitution in this area is not well grounded
in law or social science.
The Fourth Amendment is profoundly anti-government
legislation 5 enacted with the idea of preventing law enforcement
officers from detaining a citizen without just cause. 16 The legal
tests of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, which are
traditionally applicable in Fourth Amendment settings, ought to
apply to police initiated encounters, including many of those
presently deemed to be voluntary, and thus, non-seizures. 7
14

Id.

'"Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
RaV. 349 (1974).
16 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968); see Ward, supra note 7, at 240.
17Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (holding that defendant who was

carrying large travelling bags and buying a ticket for domestic travel could be

stopped by police officer and temporarily detained while the police verified
whether he was a drug courier. However, police officers exceeded their limit
when they detained him in a small room, held his ticket and drivers license and
told him that he was not free to go); see also Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438
(1980) (holding defendant could not be stopped on mere suspicion that he
preceded someone with whom he appeared to be travelling).
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Current justifications for these rules express the belief that
citizens have a duty to assist law enforcement officers.', This
belief may have held true in feudal times, but the history of such
an assumption is inconsistent with the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment.1 9
Londegaard, by all accounts, was a person of privilege. 0 If
Londegaard was not able to tell the officer to leave him alone,
then how is the ordinary citizen stopped on the street likely to
respond? This article takes the position that United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Terry v. Ohio' and Schneckloth v.
ButtamonteY and their progeny are wrong. In this article, the
author examines the tension between the rules governing forcible
detention and consensual searches and seizures. In Terry, the
Court outlined the conditions that must be proved in order to
establish that a person had been seized. In Bustamonte, the
Court's focus was on the question of consent.
Citizens, like Mr. Londegaard, ought to be advised of their
right to walk away from a police initiated encounter. In
Bustamonte, the Court specifically rejected this approach.
However, this article revisits the question and demonstrates that
many of the suppositions underlying that decision are false.
Since Bustamonte was decided, countless numbers of citizens
have had their Fourth Amendment rights trampled upon by the
police under the guise of consensual searches." In order to
minimize the potential that a citizen's rights will be violated,
there ought to be a rebuttable presumption that consent obtained
during a police instituted encounter is involuntary. Such a
Is Id.

19See Tracey Maclin, 77ze Complexity of the FourthAmendment: A Historical
Review, 77 B.U. L. REv. 925, 933 (1997) (noting that at one time the King
owned all property and each citizen had a duty to protect it).
20

See

STEPHANIE WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED, with contributions by

Marglynne Armstrong, Adrienne D. Davis and Trina Grillo (1996).
21392 U.S. 1 (1968).

22 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that when the person subjected to a search is
not in custody and the state attempts to justify the search on the basis of the
subject's consent, the state must demonstrate that the consent was voluntarily

given).

I See Ward, supra note 7.
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requirement would force courts to carefully scrutinize
government assertions that the waiver of Fourth Amendment
rights is voluntary. The author suggests that police officers be
required to inform the citizen of their right to be left alone, of
their right to decline before consent can be obtained. Proof of
mere consent should not be enough. The goal ought to be
consent that is informed and voluntary.
In examining the questions of detention, voluntariness and
consent, this article critiques Terry, Bustamonte and other
consent and detention cases decided by the Supreme Court. As
part of my analysis, I will draw upon some writings from the
field of contract law, which frequently focus on questions of
voluntariness and valid consent. 24 The article will also consider
data drawn from various relevant sociological studies,
specifically, studies and articles focusing on the situations where
persons are most vulnerable to abuses by those in positions of
authority like police officers.
This obviously is a key in
determining whether a person has voluntarily relinquished his
Fourth Amendment rights.
Finally, the author proposes that concrete warnings be given in
police initiated encounters, regardless of where they occur, to
ensure that the Fourth Amendment rights of all citizens are
adequately protected. If art imitates life, then, perhaps, there are
lessons to be learned from the motion picture Fargo.

24

AMY H. KASTELY, DEBORAH W. POST AND SHARON HOM, CONTRACTING

LAW (1996). "Because a basic tenet of contract law is that only voluntarily
made promises and agreements ought to be binding, a central focus of contract
law is on the nature of choice." Id. at 1. "The idea of voluntariness in human
relations is in turn, connected to the idea of self-determination, - the 'right to
be oneself,' to the idea that people can and should make their own choices
about their lives." Id. "Our choices are constrained by our sense of duty or
obligation to others and the presence or absence of meaningful opportunities in
our lives" Id. at 2.
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PART II
CONSENT AS THE ABSENCE OF COERCION

On June 10, 1968, the United States Supreme Court rendered
its opinion in Terry v. Ohio. "5 The appellant, Terry had been
detained [stopped] and searched [frisked] by Officer McFadden
on the suspicion that he and two confederates were about to rob a
store. At trial, McFadden acknowledged that at the time of the
interdiction, he had neither a warrant nor probable cause as
required by the Fourth Amendment.26 The government argued
that neither was needed since Terry had not been seized or
arrested.27 According to the state, since there was no seizure,
Terry's Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated. The
state contended that what had transpired was an investigatory stop
and frisk rather than a seizure or search.29
The Supreme Court was not convinced, 30 responding that any
time a citizen is confronted by the police in such a manner, the
reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Thus, the Court
reasoned a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, had
occurred. 3' The Court did, however, relax the level of certainty
needed for police intervention, absent a warrant supporting
probable cause, to a "reasonable articulable suspicion." 2 The
lesser standard was justified because the government needs only
to investigate crime, but also to prevent it, if possible. "

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
6 Id.
27

1d. at 16.

2 Id.
29id.
30 id.

31Id.
32

Id.at 29.

33 Id.
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In subsequent opinions, the Court delineated, in a precise
manner, in a precise manner, intentions concerning the standard
of whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. Part of
the Court's calculus is a two part test outlined in Michigan v.
Chesternut.-4
In Chesternut, the Court set forth two prerequisites for
reasonableness. First, there must be a show of authority, like
flashing blue lights or presentation of a badge; second, the
detainee must submit to that authority. 35 As a practical matter,
this approach is of little value because it states the obvious. The
more crucial piece of the equation is, what did the Court mean
when it asked the question-[w]ould a reasonable person feel free
to leave?
In United States v. MendenhalP6 and INS v. Delgado3 7 the
Court said that the test is objective.38 A court, in determining
whether a seizure has occurred should engage in a contextual
analysis. 39

Matters such as age, education, gender and other

attendant circumstances are relevant in the analysis." A number
of writers, including this author, have suggested that the Court's
prior decisions on that matter have not been sufficiently sensitive
to real world police encounters.'

These writers have asserted

that a more subjective approach ought to be adopted if the Court
is actually concerned about whether a reasonable person would
feel free to leave.42 This approach would force a discussion about
how fear and intimidation are critical factors in any discussion of
this issue.
Many of the critical race theorists have attempted to focus
attention on the peculiar adversarial relationship existing between

34486 U.S. 567 (1987).
" Id. at 577.
36

17

446 U.S. 544 (1981).
466 U.S. 210 (1983).

See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 545; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215.
U.S. at 554; See also Delgado, 466 U.S. at 219.
40 See Ward, supra note 7, at 255.
41 See generally Ward, supra note 7. See also Maclin, Race, supra note 12.
38

39Mendenhall, 446

42

See Ward, supra note 7.
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members of minority communities and the police. 3 Given the
long history of abuse, these people are more apt to relinquish
their rights out of fear rather than an act of free will. " A
cornerstone of the reasonable person test is the assumption that
the police will honor a person's request to be left alone. People
who are members of subordinated communities generally have
little reason to believe that their assertion of constitutional rights
will be honored." Indeed, the relationship between the citizen
and the police is based on fear; 46 fear which has been learned
from a series of negative encounters with the police. 7 It is fear
of the consequences of not cooperating with the police which
compels many to abandon constitutional rights.
The substance of the critique by critical race theorists is that in
this setting, the Court's objective, reasonable person test, as
generally applied, is oblivious to these real life problems of
police abuse. 8 One might even argue that the objective test
perpetuates the cycle of police abuse, because offending officers
are not judged on how the detainee actually felt, but how a
reasonable person would have felt under similar circumstances.
The Court's opinion in Terry and other cases, illustrates that
not every encounter between a citizen and the police presents a
Fourth Amendment problem. 49 Indeed, some-meetings might be
voluntary.50 Voluntary submission and searches do not require
warrants, probable cause or a reasonable articulable suspicion
since they do not impinge upon Fourth Amendment interests. ' If
a seizure or search is voluntary, there is no need to inquire as to
whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave.
43 Id.
JId.

45 Id.

4Id.
47Id.

"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
49 Id.
50Id.

See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1981).
s'See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 1, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544; Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
(1991).
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When is a search or seizure voluntary? The question was
answered largely in the Court's 1973 decision, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.52 Before analyzing Bustamonte, however, it is
important to note how significant the labeling or characterizing of
an encounter between a citizen and the police can be in terms of
Fourth Amendment protection.53 If Mr. Londegaard in Fargo had
been seized, then Chief Gunderson needed a warrant, probable
cause or reasonable suspicion before doing so. Were a court to
subsequently find that her conduct violated Londegaard's rights,
then any evidence derived from that meeting was the fruit of the
poisonous tree.-' Conversely, if there is no seizure, the Chief is
free to pursue any and all leads.
Bustamonte relates to just such a situation since it talks about
what, if any, affirmative steps an officer must take to inform a
party, teetering on the brink of seizure, that he or she can simply
ignore an officer's request to stay and answer questions. 55 The
issues of whether a seizure has occurred, and whether the suspect
has consented, are closely intertwined. Where one begins and
other ends is not always easily determined. What is clear,
however, is that the test for both is lacking.
In Bustamonte, a police officer stopped a car at 2:30 a.m. when
he observed that the license plate light and a headlight did not
work.5 6 Six men were in the car.57 The defendant, who was a
passenger, indicated to the officer that he was the brother of the
owner of the car.58 The officer asked if he could search the car,
and the accused replied, "Sure, go ahead." 59 No one was under
arrest at the time. 60 The officer did not advise the suspect that he
412 U.S. 218, 224-49 (1973) ("[t]he question whether a consent to search
was in fact voluntary... is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of the circumstances.").
53 Id. at 231-52.
" Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
55
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 219.
56
52

1d. at 220.

57 Id.

58 Id.

59 Id.
6 id.
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had the right to decline the request to search. 6' When the back
seat was removed, the officer recovered three checks that had
previously been stolen from a car wash.2
The trial judge denied the defendant's request to suppress,
noting that consent is an exception to the requirement of a
warrant." The question presented was whether the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments require a showing that not only was a
person's consent uncoerced, but that it was given with an
understanding that the consent could be freely withheld.'' In
short, the question was whether the government had a duty to
advise a person of their right to refuse before their consent would
be deemed voluntary.65
The Court held that the government need only demonstrate that
the consent was voluntary.6 Voluntariness is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of the circumstances.Y The
suspect's knowledge is only one factor to be taken into account
when making this assessment.63
According to the Court,
voluntary does not mean a "knowing" choice.' 9 It does,
however, encompass a decision that is essentially free and
unconstrained. 0 The psychological impact of the attending
circumstance on the accused is one consideration. 7' The concept
of voluntariness also focuses on whether the consent was the
product of duress or coercion, express or implied. 2 The Court
specifically rejected the argument that a person needed to know
that they had the right to refuse before consent would be valid.7
61 Id.
62Id.

Id.
64d. at 223.
65Md. at 225.
63

6

Id.

67Id. at

224.
68d. at 225.
691d. at 226.
70Id.
at 227.
71
Id. at 229.
72

Id.

73

1d. at 231.
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The notice requirement was rejected because it was viewed as
being impractical and because Fourth Amendment rights are not
analogous to the trial-like rights protected by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.74 In Bustamonte, the Court indicates that adverse
results might grow out of imposing a warning requirement.75
Consent searches frequently lead to information that otherwise
would be unavailable.7 6 The Court opined that leads could dry up
if suspects were advised that they had the right to decline.
This argument was also made at the time that Miranda v.
Arizona was decided.77 Studies conducted since Miranda are not
conclusive. Indeed, early studies suggest that there was only a
minor decrease in the number of confessions and, more
significantly, the conviction rate.78 The Fourth Amendment has
been construed to require that every search and seizure be
reasonable.79
The exclusionary rule applies only in those
circumstances where the benefits of its use outweigh since the
cost to society.8 0 Consent searches are reasonable and the cost to
society far outweighs any benefit that might be derived from
making consent more difficult to obtain, according to the Court. 81
The problem with the Court's analysis is that the Court is too
quick to set aside the individual's rights for the good of society.
The Court assumes that Fourth Amendment rights are less
important than those protected by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. Police initiated encounters are inherently coercive.
The citizen who is stopped, whether on the street, at their place

74
75

d. at 232.
/d.

76 id.

Dix & PARNAS, THE POLICE FUNCTION (from Criminal
Justice Administration) (4th ed. 1991).
78 Id. at 519.
71 WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, at 16.
80 Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976) (holding the interest in
promoting judicial integrity does not prevent the use of illegally seized
evidence in grand jury proceedings).
81 Bustanonte, 412 U.S. at 226 (asserting a person's consent to search and
seizure is measured by the totality of the circumstances test including, as
relevant factors, age, gender, and educational background).
77

MILLER, DAWSON,
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of work, or at home, is vulnerable. The detainee is at the mercy
of the police officer and he or she knows it.
Unfortunately, the Court does not see this encounter as raising
serious questions about voluntariness. The Court is comfortable
ignoring reality. It assumes that citizens retain a level of control
and autonomy in police initiated encounters that is not supported
by the experiences of ordinary people. This willful blindness
does not exist when the discussion on consent, voluntariness and
reasonable belief shifts to other areas of law like contracts or
property. In these areas, the law tends to be more sensitive to
issues of disparate power and the absence of meaningful choice. V
Even without the baggage of racism and sexism, Mr.
Londegaard was reluctant to tell Chief Gunderson to get out of
his office and leave him alone. Londegaard did not believe that
he was free to leave. Under the analysis in Terry and its
progeny, Londegaard is free to go about his business, and thus,
there has been no seizure under the Fourth Amendment. This
analysis ignores what is patently clear, there is a element of
coercion present that is replicated in most non-emergency police
initiated encounters.
There may have been a time when the police officer could be
viewed as your friend-but that time has long passed.83 The one
purpose of community policing strategies is to restore that trust."

82 See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 140D § 10 (a) (1981); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1635 (a)-(b) (1994). As an example when one purchases a home, the buyer
has three days to rescind the agreement. The policy underlying this law is the
assumption that critical financial decisions should not be made in the heat of

battle.
83

See Ward, supra note 7; see also WILLIAM CLIFFORD, POLICING A

DEMOCRACY 5:2 AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY 9-10 (1982).
84 CoMiMnuNrrY

POLICING CONSORTIUM,

ABOUT COMMUNITY POLICING 3

(visited Sept. 20, 1998) <http://vvw.community policinglorg/abt6cp.html >.
(stating that "[g]iven the current climate of distrust in many ... communities,
sheriffs and police chiefs and their officers will need to make a concerted
effort to forge bonds and cooperation with community members"); see also
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING

SERVICES (COPS), 175 COMMUNITIES TO RECEIVE NEW COPS (visited Sept.

20,

1998)

<http://www.usdoj.gov/cops/073098.htm>
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Were the trust relationship a given, then large numbers of police
departments would not be adopting community policing as the
new "mantra" of law enforcement. 5 Police initiated encounters
are inherently coercive since it is a relationship constructed on
disparate power.86 While there are legal remedies for addressing
police abuse, those remedies deter only those officers intent on
prosecuting a case.87 If the officer on the street does not care
about obtaining a conviction, then the citizen is at the mercy of
the officer. It is the unique nature of the power relationship, the
fear and vulnerability of every citizen, that the Court's decisions
in Terry and Bustamonte seem to ignore. Police officers by their
They cannot
very nature are persons who instill fear.
successfully operate without the element of fear.
To say that the relationship between the citizen and the police is
grounded largely in intimidation and fear is not to say that all or
most police are bad.88 But police are people with guns and with
the power to arrest (even if the case is dismissed later). The
purpose is to recognize the nature of the dynamics. The Court
should address the issue. It is unlikely that any person feels free
to leave, or that any search is voluntary when it results from a
police initiated encounter.
If courts are to insure that police initiated encounters are in fact
consensual, then safeguards similar to the prophylactic Miranda
warnings are needed.89 Regardless of one's guilt or innocence,
"[c]ommunity policing is . . .helping to foster greater community confidence
and trust in law enforcement.").
85

Id.

86 See Hector Tobar, Police Fear, Need Shape Pico-Aliso, L.A. TIMES, Apr.

28, 1991, at Bi.

See WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, § 2.05 (stating there are potential legal and
equitable remedies since legal actions include civil rights suits, tort actions,
87

injunctive relief as well as possible criminal prosecutions).
88 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224-49 (1973) (establishing

that to determine "[t]he question whether a consent to search was in fact
voluntary. . . is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the
circumstances.").
89 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding "[t]he warning of the
right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything

said can and will be held against the individual in court.").
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there are a number of social and psychological factors that
operate in concert and undercut the notion that a police initiated
confrontation can be voluntary.90 These factors tend to erode an
individual's ability to protect their interest when confronted by a
police officer. The obedience theory, 9' the social power of the
uniform,9 and the diminishing expectations of autonomy, because
of the influences of pop culture, 93 are just some of the theories
which argue that voluntariness in a police initiated encounter is
not probable. I will attempt to show how each on their own
would seem to compel one to act against his/her own best
interest. In truth, however, these systems or theories work in
tandem, thus placing the citizen at an extreme disadvantage in a
police-initiated encounter.

PART MI
VOLUNTARINESS EXAMINED
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

IN THE LIGHT OF

Obedience Theory
Adrian Barrio in his article, "Rethinking Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte: Incorporation Obedience Theory Into the Supreme
Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, "N revisits Stanley
Milgram's95 experiments in obedience theory and applies those
principles to consent searches.
I Barrio, supra note 13.
91 Id. at 233.
92

Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of Unifonn, 41 J. APp. Soc. PSYCH.

47 (1974).
93 Laura B. Schnieder, Warning: Television Violence May Be Harmful to
Children; But the Amendment May Foil CongressionalAttempts to Legislate

Against It, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 477, 482 (1994) (stating "[a]fter years of
research, accumulated evidence tends to prove 'a direct causal link between
EXPOSURE to television violence and subsequent aggressive behavior of the
viewer'").

I' Barrio, supra note 13.
95 Id. at 233.
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In 1960, Milgram conducted experiments in an attempt to
explain the unblinking loyalty of low level Nazi war criminals. 6
It appears that these individuals understood that their conduct was
inappropriate, but they participated in atrocities anyway.9 In
Milgram's experiment, individuals or testers were instructed to
administer electric shocks to any subject who responded
incorrectly to a request.9" The tester was lead to believe that it
was possible to increase the severity of the level of the shock
experienced by the subject." The study found that even though
the persons administering the pain disliked or disagreed with the
task personally, 65% of them administered the shock to the
subject. 1°° The key to getting the tester/administrator to perform
the task was his/her belief that the orders/instructions came from
a legitimate authority. 101
The results of this study support the theory that obedience to
authority is a deeply ingrained behavior or tendency.102
Furthermore, legitimate authority can and does influence
behavior to the point that it overwhelms a person's fundamental
sense of right or wrong.,03 Since the key here is the perception
that the authority is legitimate, then it is important to understand
the concept of legitimacy.' ° According to Barrio and Milgram,
1
authority is contextually perceived. Children obey teachers. 05
Moviegoers obey ushers. Civilians obey the officer in uniform.',
Implicit in this perception of authority is that there may be
consequences for ignoring it.
Milgram's study is nearly thirty years old and has been the
subject of criticism by a number of respected social
96

Id.

97 Id.

at 234.

98 Id. at 234-35.
99Id. at 235.
'00 Id. at 236.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 234.
103 Id. at 237.
104 Id. at 236.
105 Id.

106 Id.
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psychologists. °7 It has been suggested that other variables may
explain the high level of compliance or obedience.'
Thomas
Blass in his work entitled, "Understanding Behavior in the
Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality
Situations and Their Interactions," examined several of these
possible variables." Blass sets forth a number of intriguing
theories which might explain Milgram's findings." 0 He focuses
on authoritarian submissive personalities,"' interpersonal trust,
moral judgment, the high degree of social intelligence and
manifest hostility." 2 The authoritarian submissive personality is
one that is submissive, and has an uncritical attitude toward the
idealized moral authorities of the in group."' These individuals
were more apt to comply with the request to administer the
shock.
With the interpersonal trust theory, the individual has every
reason to expect that safeguards have been taken to protect the
subjects of the Milgram experiment."
They believe no
permanent harm will be caused by their conduct."' They too
appeared willing to comply." 6 Those persons who exercised
independent moral judgment and high social intelligence were
more apt to defy instructions." 7 Finally, the subjects falling into
the manifest hostility class, had no difficulty complying with the
order to shock."'
Taking all of these factors and others into account, none alone
seemed to explain away the core finding by Milgram in his study
"o7 Thomas Blass,
Understanding Behavior in the Milgrain Obedience
Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and their Interaction, 60:3J.

OF0 8PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 398 (1991).
1 id.
109 Id.
0Id. at 399-404.
"' Id. at 403.
id.
id.
114 Id.
112

113

I Id.
116 id.
117

id.

118

id.
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of obedience. 119 Clearly, certain factors make a person more or
less predisposed to obey. But, in each category significant
numbers of people willingly followed the voice of authority. 20
1
In the context of police initiated encounters, this would suggest
that the average citizen is inclined to accede to the wishes of an
officer, even if it is not in their own best interest, simply because
the police officer represents authority. In light of the Milgram
and Barrio writings, it seems absurd to suggest that consent
obtained in the police initiated encounter, such as the scene
depicted in Fargo, can be truly voluntary.
Social Power of the Uniform
Social power of the Uniform is another theory that when
interwoven with the obedience theory, makes it hard to believe
that a citizen has the capacity to act freely in a police-initiated
encounter. Leonard Bickman describes, in "The Social Power of
a Uniform, "his attempt to determine if people respond differently
to uniformed and non-uniformed authority.' 2' His finding, not
surprisingly, was that there was a higher rate of compliance with
the uniformed figures."
While not specifically focusing on
police officers, it is easy to see how Bickman's findings might
apply to police initiated encounters.
Bickman's particular
objective was to examine the relationship between uniforms and
social power. 2
Bickman's work was drawn, in part, from
Collin's and Raven's system, which categorized the basis of
4
12
social power into six levels. They were:
(1) Reward power rests on the person's belief that the
influencing agent has, in his possession, some resource which the
individual feels he can obtain by conforming to the agent's
request.
119Id.

at 407.

120 Id.

Bickman, supra note 91.
Id. at 58.
123 Id. at 47-53.
124 Id. at 48.
12'

122
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(2) Coercive power is based on the agent's ability to punish
non-compliance.
(3) Legitimate power is based on internalized values which
specify that an agent has a legitimate right to exert influence and
that this influence ought to be accepted.
Cultural values,
acceptance of the social hierarchy, or role prescriptions are often
the basis of legitimate power. Obedience and compliance to an
experimenter's orders in laboratory situations are probably based
on legitimate power.'
(4) Referent power is based on the identification with the agent.
The agent derives his power from his attractiveness.
(5) Expert power stems from the perception that the agent
possesses superior knowledge or ability. Expert power operates
only as long as the agent is seen as acting in good faith and within
the area of this expertness.
(6) Informational power, added later is based on information
communicated by the agent. 1 6
The subjects in this experiment were asked to pick up a paper
bag, to place a dime in a parking meter, or to stand in a particular
spot while waiting for a bus. The power or authority figure
making the request was dressed in one of three ways: as a
civilian, a milkman, or in what superficially appeared to be a
police officer's uniform. 2 The compliance percentage rate by
subjects approached by the civilian and milkman were 14% and
19% respectively. The guard, however, received a significantly
higher compliance rate of 38%. Neither the age or gender of the
subject seemed to significantly alter these findings.t'8 Rates or
percentage of compliance did increase if the subject was coached
or further prompted by words or conduct. 2 9 An interesting aspect
of the experiment was that people who, during pre-screening

125 Id.
126

127

Id. at 49.
See Bickman, supra note 91, at 50-53.

128 Id.
129

Id.
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indicated how they might respond to authority, did not necessarily
act consistently with those earlier comments.
"The predictions people make about their behavior in dealing
with authorities cannot be counted on for protecting them from
carrying out what they may perceive as not being orders from a
legitimate authority."' 30
Given Bickman's findings, it is not surprising that Mr.
Londegaard would allow himself to be interrogated by an out-ofstate police officer even though he was not required to submit to
questioning. Since Londegaard was involved in the kidnapping of
his wife, why did he not simply say, "I'm busy, go away."
Both the obedience and social power of the uniform theories point
out that absent some kind of preliminary warning, the average
citizen will find it nearly impossible to tell an approaching officer
that, "I don't want to talk with you now." It defies logic to
characterize such meetings as being consensual encounters which
may subsequently lead to the voluntary relinquishing or waiving
of important constitutional rights.
Pop Culture
Another variable at work in eroding the civilian's ability to
walk away from the police officer is the impact of popular
In this setting, pop culture means television and the
culture.'
32
movies. Social scientists and others for decades have suggested
that there is a strong link between violence in society and
violence depicted on the screen.
130

'33

It is reasonable to infer that

Id. at 57.

...
See generally Laura W. Brill, The First Amendment and the Power of
Suggestion: Protecting "Negligent" Speakers in Cases of Initiative Harm, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 984 (1994).
132 L.J. Shrum, Effects of Television Portrayals of Crime and Violence on
Viewer's Perceptions of Reality: A Psychological Process Perspective, 22
LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 259, 266 (1998) (asserting that television viewing
does, in fact, affect social judgment).
33
'
Id. at 261.
cultivation theory posits that long term viewing of the

systematic distortion of reality provided by television
programs

will have a predictable

effect on viewers.
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other social values might be altered by exposure to television and
movies.34
Often there is discussion about the dumbing down or lowering

of expectations when it comes to what is acceptable or
unacceptable behavior. 135

Not more than two decades ago,

wearing earrings was viewed as aberrant behavior for men.13 5
Today, it is accepted. There was a time when people could not

imagine metal detectors in public schools or airports, but now
federal buildings and public libraries have alarms, stores have
videotapes, and some employees are forced to submit to drug
tests and lie detectors. 137

Expectations change as to what is an appropriate use of police
power.13

Television and the movies play a role in the shifting of

attitudes.139

It does not seem to be a great stretch to hypothesize

that the viewer of programs like NYPD Blue, Homicide and Lav
and Order would feel powerless when confronted by police

officers.
Specially, the more people watch television, the more they
will "cultivate" the television message and thus be more
likely to believe that the real world resembles the world of
television.
Id. See also George G. Gerbner, "Living with Television: T7he Dynamics
of Cultivation Process," in PERSPECrIVEs ON MEDIA EFFECTS 17-48

(Jennings Bryant and Dolf Ziliman eds., 1986)(asserting that the rate of
violence on television programs is roughly ten times greater than real
world incidence).
34 Brill, supra note 131, at 984.
135

Id.

This is not to imply that there is anything wrong with men wearing
earrings. It is merely an example of how fashion and behavior can change.
17 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (discussing the
detention of a citizen in an airport).
138 See Richard W. Stevenson, An Anti-Gang Movie Opens to Violence, N.Y.
TIMEs July 27, 1991, at C13. There have been instances when movie theaters
have called for additional security or canceled showings completely because of
the fear that viewers might be provoked into violence. The controversies over
the films-"The Warriors," "Colors," and "Boyz-n-the-Hood," come to mind.
Id.
139 See L.J. Shrum, supra note 132, at 261 (linking television and movies
together here although studies regarding television are more prominent).
136
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The March 31, 1998 episode of NYPD Blue depicted a woman
named Nadine being questioned by detectives Bobby Simone and
Diane Russell. Nadine was detained on an outstanding traffic
warrant. When the questioning drifts to other areas, she states
clearly, "I want a lawyer." The detectives do not acknowledge
the request and just continue their questioning about Nadine's
0
relationship with a murder suspect. 14
On the April 14, 1998 segment of NYPD Blue, the suspect Sam
is being interrogated by three detectives, Andy Sipowicz, Bobby
Simone and Diane Russell. When Sam gives an answer that
seems evasive, Detective Sipowicz slaps him, and the detective
demands a better answer. No one objects to the slapping, except
the victim. He subsequently goes on to make incriminating
statements. In neither episode are the detainees warned of their
rights.
Some will argue, who cares? Londegaard arranged the
kidnapping of his wife. Why should the bad guys get more
protection? These folks are only getting what they deserve. The
question is, are we prepared to sacrifice our autonomy - the right
to be left alone - in order to have more efficient law enforcement?
When the Miranda decision was issued, many assumed that
confessions would dry up - disappear. 4 1 It was asserted that
fewer crimes would be successfully solved and prosecuted.'
Those opposed to issuing a warning in police initiated encounter
situations are apt to make the same kinds of arguments. The
detained citizen needs to be told that she or he is not required to
speak with the officer. However, the same fears expressed when
Miranda was decided are likely to be invoked. Given these
concerns, it is useful to consider the various post-Mirandastudies
to determine if, in fact, the cost of warning outweighs the
140

NYPD Blue (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 31, 1998).

14

NYPD Blue (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 14, 1998).
See George C. Thomas III, Is MirandaA Real World Failure? A Pleafor

142

More (and better) Empiricial Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996). See
also Paul C. Cassell, Miranda'sSocial Cost, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387 (1996);

Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86:3 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996).
143 Leo, supra note 142, at 622.
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benefits. Are more criminals going free? Is public safety being
sacrificed because the police are handcuffed? '"
The initial post-Miranda studies disputed the assertion that
clearance rates dropped precipitously.'45 It is worth noting that
fewer confessions do not necessarily result in fewer
convictions.'" For a variety of reasons, early studies may have
been flawed. Nevertheless, one study of cases from Washington,
D.C. covering the period of 1965-1966 found only a 3 % change
after Miranda.47 A study from Seaside City, a subdivision of Los
through 1968 found approximately a
Angeles, for the period 1964
41
confessions.'
2% drop in
More recent studies suggest that the cost of Miranda may be
higher than was earlier believed. It is argued that instead of
looking at percentages, we should consider the total number of
cases lost. In United States v. Leon, 1 9 the Court noted that
percentages mask a large absolute number of felons who are
released. 1-4

Leon dealt with the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
under the Fourth Amendment rather than Miranda. Even if true,
it does not mean that Miranda was a bad idea. The new data is
not entirely clear either. In spite of Hollywood's depiction of
If nothing else,
police work, Miranda changed attitudes.
arguably, it educated the police and made them less abusive and
more sensitive to the rights of suspects. Miranda does seem to
deter the more outrageous forms of police misconduct.'

144
Id.

Thomas, supra note 142, at 822.
'" Leo, supra note 142, at 637.
147 James W. Witt, Non Coercive Interrogation and Administration of
Criminal Justice, 64 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 320 (Seaside City Study
1973); Richard J. Medalia et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our
Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347
(1968).
'" Witt, supra note 147.
49 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
,s See Cassell, supra note 142, at 483-84 (1996).
5
1Id. at 473.
145
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When Miranda is violated, the suspect's Fifth Amendment right
has not, in fact, been abused.152 This is not true when a citizen is
stopped and forced to respond to an officer or suffer the
consequences. Here, the Fourth Amendment rights of privacy
and autonomy are clearly- implicated.5 3 Given the importance of

the right, police officers ought to be required to say something
before a person submits.
It is reasonable to infer that regular viewers of programs like
these would have little reason to believe that a police-initiated
encounter could be characterized as consensual. Those with the
courage to assert their constitutional rights can expect to be
threatened or worse. Without the officer being required to
inform the citizen of his/her rights, what will keep the
Londegaards of the world from giving away valuable rights? It is
ironic that, had the exchange between an officer and a citizen
been converted into a commercial transaction - a contract, any
by-product of that encounter - would be subjected to scrutiny
under the doctrine of unconscionability. 'I

Id. at 472; See generally Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Mapp
v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"' See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry holds that when police have
probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion, they may stop and search a
person on the street for weapons. The Terry standard is an objective one:
"[w]ould the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or
search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken
was appropriate?" Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925)). See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)
(discussing the detention of a citizen in an airport).
' See U.C.C. § 2-301; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 208 (1977); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C.
App. 1964) (dealing with the potential unconscionability of a contract between
a consumer and a furniture retailer); Commentaries by Deborah Post Waire,
152

THE SQUARE DEAL FURNITURE COMPANY in CONTRACTING LAW,

supra note

24, at 638-43 and Muriel Morisey Spence, Teaching Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 3 TEMP. POL. AND Civ. RTs. L. REV. 89 (1994);
(cautioning about stereotypes concerning race, gender, and class which
frequently arise in a discussion of the unequal bargaining power and potential
unconscionability of the consumer contracts in the Walker-Thomas case).
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CONCLUSION
The combined forces of obedience to authority, the power of
the uniform and lower expectations of privacy make it imperative
that citizens be told from the outset that they do have a choice. If
the concept of voluntariness and consent are to have any
meaning, then the Court should impose safeguards which will
insure that the byproduct of a police initiated encounter indeed is
voluntary and consensual.
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